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Abstract
Human systems and environmental systems are often treated as existing in isolation from one
another, whereas in fact they are often two parts of a single, coupled human-environment system.
Developing theoretical models of coupled human-environment systems is a continuing area of re-
search, although relatively few of these models are based on differential equations. Here we develop
a simple differential equation coupled human-environment system model of coupled forest growth
dynamics and conservationist opinion dynamics in a human population. The model assumes lo-
gistic growth and harvesting in the forest. Opinion spread in the human population is based the
interplay between conservation values stimulated by forest rarity, and injunctive social norms that
tend to support population conformity. We find that injunctive social norms drive the system to
the boundaries of phase space, whereas rarity-based conservation priorities drive the system to the
interior. The result is complex dynamics including limit cycles and alternative stable states that do
not occur if injunctive social norms are absent. We also find that increasing the inherent perceived
value of forests is the best way to boost and stabilize forest cover while also boosting conservationist
opinion in the population. We conclude that simple models can provide insights and suggest pat-
terns that might be harder to see with complicated, high-dimensional models, and therefore should
be pursued more often in research on coupled human-environment systems.
Keywords: Imitation dynamics, Socio-ecological system, Differential equation model,
Alternative stable states, Regime shift.
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1. Introduction
To meet the growing demand for food, fresh water, timber, fibre and fuel, human be-
ings have been changing ecosystems for substantial gains to their well-being and economic
development, but this has also degraded many ecosystem services and increased risk of cat-
astrophic changes in local, regional and global environments (Marten (2001); Francis and
Krishnamurthy (2014)). Many natural resources upon which human are depending are either
disappeared or are in threat by human action (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
According to some scholars, three of nine ‘planetary boundaries’ which should not be ex-
ceeded in order for humanity to operate safely have already been exceeded: biodiversity loss,
interruption of nitrogen cycle and climate change (Rockström et al., 2009).
Sustainable land use, including maintaining healthy forest ecosystems, are also one of the
nine planetary boundaries, and deforestation is threatening to push us past this boundary
as well (Rockström et al., 2009). Due to direct human activities, about 7.5 million hectares
of North American forests (or 1% of total forest area) are disturbed each year (Masek et al.,
2011). The Amazon forest has lost at least 17% of its forest cover, while the Sumatra island
of Indonesia lost 85% of original forests in last five decades due to human activities (WWF,
2013). Intensive ranching is an important culprit in deforestation: it is estimated that 70%
of deforestation in Latin American forest has been caused by cattle ranching operations
(Fearnside, 1993).
Forest-grassland mosaics and savanna systems are also under threat. Savanna contain
a large proportion of rapidly growing human populations, including much range-land and
livestock (Scholes and Archer, 1997). Intensive land use through cultivation and mining ac-
tivities completely altered 14% of South African savanna biome (Mogaka, 2001). Similarly,
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the southern Brazilian Campos-Araucaria forest-grassland mosaic is highly diverse (espe-
cially the grassland component) but is continuously facing threats in its biodiversity and
has lost around 25% of land in past three decades (Overbeck et al., 2007; Henderson et al.,
2016).
A coupled human and environment system (HES or CHES)–also known as coupled human
and natural system–is a system in which a human subsystem and an environment subsystem
are connected through a coupled feedback loop of mutual influence. Such interactions can
apply at local scales, global scales, or across multiple scales (Liu et al., 2007) and can also
result in regime shifts between alternative stable states (Lade et al., 2013; Bauch et al.,
2016).
For instance, as human activities lead to a decline in natural ecosystems, the decline in
natural ecosystems can in turn stimulate human action to conserve endangered ecosystems
or attempt to restore badly damaged ecosystems (Heinen and Yonzon, 1994). For instance
Sudbury, Canada began replanting trees destroyed by industry-generated acid rain in a
massive effort starting in the 1970s, thereby improving both environmental quality and
socioeconomic conditions (McCracken, 2013; Anand et al., 2005).
In the past, various mathematical models have explored human-environment interactions
in the context of forest dynamics, including models that account for socioeconomic and
demographic factors (An et al., 2005); two-person games and their impact on deforestation
(Rodrigues et al., 2009); the effect of landowner decision-making on landscape dynamics
(Satake and Iwasa, 2006), Markov chain models to study the effect of social learning on
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landowner decisions (Satake et al., 2007); the role of governance in landowner decision-
making and landscape dynamics (Henderson et al., 2013); and tipping points (Bauch et al.,
2016) and regime shifts (Henderson et al., 2016) in coupled forest HESs, among others.
Injunctive social norms–also known as moral norms–are the unwritten but socially accept-
able rules and guidelines of a society. Such rules has been established based on their practice
and may vary from society to society. The role and influence of injunctive social norms
has been accounted for in models of coupled dynamics of vaccinating behaviour and disease
dynamics (Oraby et al., 2014), as well as in coupled HES models where it has been studied
in the context of forest pest invasion due to human decisions to transport firewood (Barlow
et al., 2014); harvesting of a renewable resources, in the form of social ostracism directed
toward over-harvesters (Lade et al., 2013); and forest dynamics (Satake et al., 2007).
Previous research in modelling coupled human-environment systems has predominantly
relied upon agent-based models (An et al., 2005). In the occasional case where differential
equation models have been used, analysis has been primarily numerical, often due to the
dimensionality of the system (Henderson et al., 2016), stochasticity (Barlow et al., 2014),
nonlinear resource harvesting (Bauch et al., 2016) or use of nonlinear recruitment thresholds
(Innes et al., 2013; Henderson et al., 2016). In this paper we develop a simple, differential-
equation coupled human-environment system model of a human population making conser-
vation decisions about a forest ecosystem lacking a recruitment threshold. Our objective was
to evaluate the influence of injunctive social norms on coupled HES models by comparing
models with and without social norms, and to gain general insights by applying the methods
of qualitative analysis of ODEs to the system in order to generate more mathematical rigor
than has been feasible before in models of coupled HESs. The model also assumes that
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human perception of the conservation priority of the forest system depends on how rare the
ecosystem is.
2. Model
We let F denote the proportion of forest cover in a region, with the remaining land cover
G = 1 − F being other land types include natural grassland, urban spaces, pasture, and
other natural or anthropogenic types. Suppose individuals are divided only into two groups,
where x is the proportion of forest conservationists and 1 − x is the proportion of non-
conservationists. Here an individual adopts one of the two opinions, either to favour forest
conservation (F) or favour other land uses (G). Based on the two strategies, individuals get
sources of information and sample one another at the rate k′. In this case, an individual
adopting strategy F samples other individuals adopting either of the strategies F or G. Let
π(F) be the perceived value of forest, and π(G) be the perceived value of other land use.
Before switching their strategies, an individual compares utility gain and loss received by
adopting the same strategy and may switch strategies if the utility for switching is attractive
enough. If π(F) > π(G) then the one adopting strategy G switches into strategy F with prob-
ability pUF (F ) (let), where UF (F ) = π(F)− π(G) > 0 be the net gain in utility by adopting
strategy F than adopting strategy G and p is the proportionality constant. Therefore, (1−x)
non-conservationists at any given time become conservationists at the rate (1−x)k′xpUF (F ).
Similarly if UG(F ) = π(G)− π(F) > 0 then x conservationists becomes non-conservationists
at the rate xk′(1− x)αpUG(F ) where, UG(F ) is the net gain in utility, by adopting strategy
G than adopting strategy F and α is the scaling constant. For convenience, we absorb α into
k′.
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Combining above two rates gives:
dx
dt
= (k′p)x(1− x)[UF (F )− UG(F )]
= kx(1− x)[UF (F )− UG(F )],
(1)
where k = pk′.
From Innes et al. (2013), UF (F ) = r0G − q0F , where r0 and q0 control the conservation
value (or simply the value/importance) of forest and other land use respectively. In addition
to the utility gain UF (F ) or UG(F ), each member in each social group further feels a uniform
pressure δ0 to remains on the same group due to injunctive social norms. Hence an individual
adopting a strategy F experiences the uniform pressure at the rate δ0x and those adopting
G experience the uniform pressure at the rate δ0(1 − x). Therefore UF (F ) and UG(F ) in
equation (1), can be replaced by UF (F ) + δ0x and −UF (F ) + δ0(1− x) respectively to get,
dx
dt
= kx(1− x)[UF (F ) + δ0x+ UF (F )− δ0(1− x)]
= kx(1− x)[r −mF + δ0(2x− 1)],
(2)
where r = 2r0, q = 2q0 and m = r + q. This imitation dynamic has been used in previous
models of coupled HESs (Innes et al., 2013; Barlow et al., 2014; Lade et al., 2013) and
coupled behavior-disease systems (Oraby et al., 2014).
The corresponding equation for forest cover is a simple logistic population growth model
with harvesting
Ḟ = RFG− h(1− x)F, (3)
where R is the natural succession rate of forest from other land and h is the harvesting rate.
h can be thought of as a maximal harvesting rate, whereas the realized harvesting rate is
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h(1− x) and can be less than the maximal harvesting rate h due to population support for
conservationism. Here, as the new forest depends upon the existing forest and the available
land to grow new trees, we consider the new forest is created at the rate proportional to the
product of existing forest and other land areas. Also, the harvesting rate is proportional to
the product of existing forest cover and proportion of non-conservationists.
Therefore the complete system of equations can be written as
ẋ = κx(1− x)[c− F + δ(2x− 1)]
Ḟ = RF (1− F )− h(1− x)F,
(4)
where G ≡ 1−F , κ ≡ km, c ≡ r
m
and δ ≡ δ0
m
. The model variables, parameters, and baseline
parameter values appear in Table 1.
Table 1. Variables/Parameters, their definition, ranges and baseline values.
Variables Descriptions Ranges
x Proportion of conservationist [0, 1]
F Forest cover [0, 1]
Parameters Descriptions Values (Reference/Calibrated)
κ Social learning rate (modified) 0.5/year, Davis et al. (2001)
c Relative conservation value of forest 0.6
δ Strength of injunctive social norms (modified) 0.01
R Natural succession rate of forest 0.01/year
h harvesting efficiency 0.02/year
3. Results
We first analyze the model with injunctive social norms included. In the following sub-
section, we will analyze the special case where injunctive social norms are not included, and
then compare the two models.
3.1. Model with injunctive social norms.
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3.1.1. Model Equilibria. From equation (4), there are two steady states (F ∗, x∗) of full non-
conservationism. One has no forest cover
A1 = (0, 0)








A2 is biologically meaningful when the natural succession rate of forest dominates the har-
vesting rate, that is h < R. In this case, lower the harvesting rate, higher the forest cover.
There are two steady states of full conservationism. One has no forest cover
A3 = (0, 1)
and the second one has full forest cover
A4 = (1, 1).
In the above steady states, the population has the homogeneous opinion of either conservation
or non-conservation.
Finally, there are two steady states with mixtures of conservationists and rest non-conservationists.




























Figure 1. Appearance of weakly damped oscillations to an interior equilib-
rium when the social learning rate κ = 2/year. All other parameter values are
as in Table 1.
whereas the second one has a mix of forest and other land cover
A6 = (1 + hS, 1 +RS)
and this is the only interior equilibrium of the model. Here A5 is biologically meaningful
when injunctive social norms dominate the conservation value of forest, that is c < δ. A6 is
biologically meaningful if 0 > RS > −1 and 0 > hS > −1, where S = 1−c−δ
2Rδ−h . Here, A6 is
biologically meaningful if the absolute value of S is larger than the reciprocal of both h and
R.
3.1.2. Stability and dynamics. From local stability analysis, A1 = (0, 0) is locally asymptoti-
cally stable (LAS) if the injunctive social norms dominate the conservation value of forest and
harvesting dominates the natural succession rate, that is δ
c
> 1 and h
R
> 1. Here, in the pop-
ulation with a higher harvesting rate, stronger injunctive norms shift the population to the









is LAS if h
R
< 1 + δ − c < 1 or h
R
< 1 < 1 + δ − c. In either case,
harvesting is dominated by natural succession. Here, the population can consist entirely of
non-conservationists and yet forest can persist at intermediate levels because harvesting is
dominated by the rate of natural succession.
A3 = (0, 1) is always unstable and its instability is reasonable as total forest devastation
is impossible in the presence of full forest conservationism, since harvesting always tends to
zero as the proportion of conservationists approaches unity.
A4 = (1, 1) is LAS if injunctive social norms dominate the conservation value of other
land use, that is c + δ > 1. Here, stronger injunctive social norms force the population
to a homogeneous opinion of full conservationism; it does not matter whether harvesting






is unstable and the instability is reasonable except at δ = c because total
forest devastation is impossible in the presence of conservationism.
From the above results (and neglecting for the moment the interior equilibrium), we con-
clude that for sufficiently strong injunctive social norms, the population converges either
to the state of full non-conservationistm x = 0 or the state of full conservationism x = 1.
However, in the population where harvesting dominates natural succession with sufficiently
strong injunctive social norms, we notice the co-existence of full non-conservationism A1
with full-conservationism A4. Also, the state of full conservationism A4 can coexist with the
state of full non-conservationism A2.






c + δ < 1, 0 < 2κδ(1 − x∗)x∗ < RF ∗, where F ∗ = 1 + hS and x∗ = 1 + RS. In this
case, the injunctive social norms are dominated by the conservation value of other land use.
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Intuitively, the interior equilibrium is stable because injunctive social norms are not strong
enough to force the population to either extreme of x = 0 or x = 1, and the conservation
value of forest is strong enough to support an intermediate level of both forest cover and
conservationist opinion, without the support from injunctive social norms. We note that A6
cannot coexist with any other steady states.
Local stability analysis does not preclude the possibility of periodic solutions or other non-
trivial dynamical behaviour away from steady states. At κ = 2/year, numerical simulations
suggest the possibility of a stable limit cycle, as conservationism and forest cover appear
to oscillate perpetually over very long timescales (Figure 1). The presence of oscillations
would be significant: oscillating forest cover is less desirable than stable forest cover since
harvesting/restoration cycles could create perpetual disturbances in highly biodiverse climax
forest communities. However, we were able to rule out the possibility of a stable limit cycles
for certain parameter regimes: for R > h and sufficiently small value of κδ, periodicity in
the interior region D = {(F, x) : 0 < F < 1, 0 < x < 1} can be ruled out by using Dulac’s
criterion (Hale and Koçak, 2012, p.373) (for detail see SI Appendix: Appendix A). Thus
for R > h and sufficiently small value of κδ, using poincaré–Bendixson theorem (Hale and
Koçak, 2012, p.366), the interior equilibrium solution A6 is globally asymptotically stable in
D. Nonetheless, the weakly damped nature of oscillations to the equilibrium interior state
are still undesirable due to their implication of harvesting/restoration cycles in the popula-
tion and the ubiquitous presence of noise, which can sustained weakly damped oscillations













Figure 2. The relationship between harvesting rate and natural succession
rate influences the region where all equilibria are unstable. Subpanels show
(a) succession dominating harvesting h = 0.01/year, R = 0.02/year and (b)
harvesting dominating succession h = 0.02/year, R = 0.01/year. The equilib-
ria in the subpanels are stable in the corresponding region. White is the region
of instability for all steady states and the presence of stable limit cycles. All
other parameters except those being varied appear in Table 1.
Parameter planes provide significant insight into the conditions of stability of the various
steady states. From the c − δ parameter plane, we observe major changes in the stability
paradigm when we reverse the relative magnitude of the harvesting rate and the natural
succession rate. Stability of a state of mixed land with full non-conservationism A2 (Figure
2a) has nearly been replaced by the stability of a state of no-forest cover with full non-
conservationism A1 (Figure 2b). Also the region of stability of interior steady state has been
drastically decreased, resulting in a larger region of instability for all steady states. In this
region of instability, numerical simulations indicate the presence of stable limit cycles.
In bifurcation diagrams we observe that even a small harvesting rate can cause the oscil-
lations in the system. Decreasing the social learning rate κ stabilizes the system by reducing
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Figure 3. Decreasing the social learning rate k or increasing the natural
succession rate R helps reduce the tendency to oscillate. Subpanels show
bifurcation diagrams of forest cover F versus harvesting h for various values of
κ, (a) 4/year (b) 2/year (c) 1.5/year, and various values of R (d) 0.015/year (e)
0.02/year (f) 0.03/year. κ = 4/year in subpanels (d-f); all other parameters
except those being varied appear in Table 1.
the range of parameters h for which oscillatory solutions are obtained (Figure 3a-c). Simi-
larly, increasing the natural succession rate R (Figure 3d-f), reduces the parameter range for
which oscillations occur. Also the oscillations that appeared due to small conservation value
can be reduced and removed with the increase in the conservation value (SI Appendix Fig.S2
a-c). But an increase in injunctive social norms increases oscillations for a larger range of
harvesting (SI Appendix Fig.S2 d-f).
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The time evolution of model dynamics helps illustrate the role of injunctive social norms
in the model. For certain initial conditions, injunctive social norms do not favour conserva-
tionism. When x is initially small, human preference starts increasing during an early phase
of forest destruction (Figure 4a). For higher values of injunctive social norms, it may take
several years to centuries to manifest change in human preference and thus in forest cover
(Figure 4b, c). Also based on our baseline parameter values, society is practicing a higher
harvesting rate than the natural succession rate of forest. As a result, stronger social norms
support harvesting and lead the forest to decline. Thus stronger social norms gradually
increase the population opinion homogeneity, eventually dominating conservation priorities
for the rare and endangered species. The situation is different over a larger time window,
in which an increase in injunctive social norms compel the forest cover to accelerate in both
direction as well as helps to reduce the oscillation (SI Appendix Fig.S1). Note that the sit-
uation will be different when we change the initial conditions such that x is initially higher:
in these cases, social norms will move population to greater conservationism (SI Appendix
Fig.S3 a-c).
Because of conservation priorities to protect forest ecosystems, forest cover can be main-
tained at an optimum level even when only 20% of forest cover remains initially (Figure 4d).
Also if there is a larger difference between initial prevalence of conservationism and initial
forest cover, forest cover will initially decline before it starts to recover (Figure 4e,f).
14
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Figure 4. For the initial condition (F0, x0) = (0.9, 0.1), increasing the
strength of injunctive social norms δ, (a) 0.05 (b) 0.2 (c) 0.4, decrease con-
servationism and thus forest cover. Varying the initial value of forest cover
F0, (d) 0.2 (e) 0.6 (f) 0.9 does not affect much the forest cover in longer time
window. All other parameters except those being varied appear in Table 1.
3.2. Model without injunctive social norms.
3.2.1. Model equilibria. Substituting δ = 0 in equation (4), the coupled HES model reduces
to a model with the following system of equations:
ẋ = κx(1− x)(c− F )
Ḟ = RF (1− F )− h(1− x)F.
(5)
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From equation (5), there are two steady states (F ∗, x∗) of full non-conservationism of
forest. One has no forest cover
B1 = (0, 0)








B2 is biologically meaningful when natural succession rate dominates the harvesting rate,
that is, h
R
< 1. In this case, a lower harvesting rate results in higher forest cover.
There are two steady states of full conservationism. One has no forest cover
B3 = (0, 1)
and the second one has full forest cover
B4 = (1, 1).
In the above steady states, the population has the homogeneous opinion of either full con-
servationism or full non-conservationism.
Note that steady states B1, B2, B3, B4 are the same as steady states A1, A2, A3, A4
of the model with injunctive social norms, and A5 of the social norms model is no longer
meaningful in this case.








and it is biologically meaningful when the ratio of the harvesting rate to the succession rate
dominates the relative conservation value of other land cover, that is h
R
> 1− c. Here, larger
conservation values result in higher forest cover and prevalence of conservationism.
3.2.2. Stability and dynamics. The absence of injunctive social norms has a large impact
on the stability of the coupled HES. The steady states of full non-conservationism and no
forest cover, and full conservationism and full forest cover, can no longer be stable, making
conservation priorities based on the rarity of forest more important for dynamics.
B1 = (0, 0) is unstable and its instability in the absence of injunctive social norms is
reasonable as extreme rarity of forest should cause x to diverge away from zero, causing F
to rise as well. This contrasts with the finding that A1 = (0, 0) can be stable for certain







is LAS if the ratio of harvesting rate to natural succession rate is less
than the relative conservation value of other land, that is h
R
< 1− c. A2 can no longer exist
if a conservationist exists in the population. x = 0 implies ẋ = 0 and thus the line x = 0 is
invariant. Thus, the only one locally asymptotically stable staedy state B2 at the boundary
is globally asymptotically stable (GAS) at x = 0.
B3 = (0, 1) is unstable and its instability is reasonable because forest cover cannot remain
zero in the presence of full conservationism. B4 = (1, 1) is also unstable because full conser-
vationism cannot remain stable in the presence of full forest cover, due to competing needs
for other uses of land. This contrasts with the finding that A4 can be stable for certain
parameter regimes in the model with social norms.






is LAS if the ratio of the harvesting rate




> 1 − c. B5 is LAS if it is biologically meaningful. Periodicity in the interior region
D = {(F, x) : 0 < F < 1, 0 < x < 1} can be ruled out without any parameter restriction by
using Dulac’s criterion (Hale and Koçak, 2012, p.373) (for detail see SI Appendix: Appendix
B). Thus using poincaré–Bendixson theorem (Hale and Koçak, 2012, p.366), the interior
equilibrium B5 is GAS in D when it exists. Note that the stability analysis of above five
steady states is conducted in detail in SI Appendix: Appendix B.
In the h − R parameter plane (Figure 5a-c), we observe significant differences from the
model with social norms included. We only observe two stable equilibria, A2 and A5. Increas-
ing the conservation value of forest shrinks the region of stability of pure non-conservationism
B2 and thus increases the region of stability for the interior steady state B5. Also, as the
forest cover in the interior steady state directly depends upon the conservation value c, forest








Figure 5. An increase in conservation value c increases the region of stability
of the interior equilibrium A5 and thus decreases the stability region for the
boundary equilibrium A2. For (a) c = 0.1 (b) c = 0.4 (c) c = 0.6, A5 and
A2 are stable in the labeled regions. All other parameters except those being
varied appear in Table 1.
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a.	   b.	   c.	  
d.	   e.	   f.	  














































Figure 6. Increasing the social learning rate κ results in more rapid turnover,
while increasing the natural succession rate R increases forest cover but not
conservationism. Impact of variation in social learning rate κ/year, (a) 0.5
(b) 2 (c) 5 and natural succession rate R/year, (d) 0.03 (e) 0.04 (f) 0.07; all
other parameters except those being varied appear in the table 1.
A rapid increase in the social learning rate has both positive as well as negative impacts
on the system. A low social learning rate results in slow decline of forest but also a slow
recovery rate (Figure 6a), whereas a higher social learning rate increases both the rate of
forest destruction as well as the rate of forest recovery, at least up unto its natural maximum
R (Figure 6b, c). A higher social learning rate also results in rapid transitions between
population states and decreases the period of damped oscillations. If the natural succession
rate of forest is increased, forest cover dominates other land cover most of the time (Figure
19
6d-f). Also, a higher succession rate guarantees sustainable forest cover for a longer time
window. Conservationism declines on account of the abundance of forest, but because R is
high, forest cover can be maintained even in the absence of public support.
a.	   b.	   c.	  
d.	   e.	   f.	  














































Figure 7. Increasing the conservation value of forest c supports forest cover
and conservationism, while increasing the harvesting efficiency h reduces forest
cover but also stimulates conservationism and thus forest recovery. Impact of
variation in relative conservation value of forest c, (a) 0.2 (b) 0.5 (c) 0.8 and
harvesting rate h/year, (d) 0.01 (e) 0.04 (f) 0.1; all other parameters except
those being varied appear in the table 1.
A higher conservation value of forest c helps to increase conservationism and thus forest
cover (Figure 7a-c). It also stops the sharp increase in forest destruction by changing the
human preference rapidly. A higher harvesting rate increases the rate of forest decline,
but it also stimulates a more rapid response from conservationism, causing a decline in the
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effective harvesting rate h(1 − x) (Figure 7d-f). As a result, when h is large enough, full
conservationism is stable and the forest can recover at its maximal rate R.
4. Discussion
Here we compared dynamics of a coupled HES model for forest growth and conservationist
opinion in a human population when injunctive social norms were included to when injunctive
social norms were excluded. We found that the model with injunctive social norms had five
possible obserable outcomes (four stable equilibrium, plus stable limit cycles) whereas the
model without social norms only had two stable equilibria. In the case of the model with
injunctive social norms, stable equilibria could also co-exist, while in the case of the model
without social norms, the two stable equilibria are simply globally asymptotically stable
whenever they exist in their respective parts of parameter space. The complexity in the case
of the model with social norms arises because injunctive social norms drive dynamics to the
boundaries of the phase space, while rarity-based conservation drives it back to the interior.
These results were established with a mixture of numerical and qualitative analysis, including
establishment of global asymtotic stability using the Dulac criterion and other methods.
The model yielded other interesting predictions. In general, if human opinion is based
only on the desire to protect endangered ecosystems, destruction of the whole forest as well
as the existence of full forest cover should not be possible. However, injunctive social norms
make it possible because when the norms are universally accepted, the population persists
at the boundary of phase space for a long period of time, even the punishment efforts has
already been stopped (Helbing et al., 2010). At this point the conservation value of rare
ecosystems is overshadowed by social psychology.
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For the model with injunctive social norms, the local and the global stability of the interior
steady state are tied to complex parameter restriction, whereas the situation is simple when
social norms are absent. As an example, the periodicity at the interior steady state of the
model with social norms can be ruled out under certain parameter restriction but it can be
easily ruled out without any condition when social norms are absent.
Our analysis also shows that without other supports, even the nominal rate of harvesting
(2% as our baseline value, which is small compared to the rate under current practice in
many low-income countries) can lead to removal of almost all forest cover. In a coupled HES
setting, a population may eventually respond by demanding conservationism when forest
cover becomes to low, leading to a partial counteracting of higher maximal harvesting rates.
However, this mechanism does not work perfectly and only conserves forest at the cusp of
extinction. In contrast, increasing the conservation value of forest (c) has the uniform effect
of both boosting and stabilizing forest cover as well as supporting conservationism in the
population. Thus we suggest policy that teaches the conservation value of forests can be an
effective way to help preserve forests and the species that depend on them.
Our model made simplifying assumptions in the name of analytical tractability, some of
which might influence our predictions. For instance, we ignored stochastic effects, which
could be important in modelling the continued persistence or extinction of ecosystems at
risk. We also assumed a single, closed population, whereas in fact both human populations
and forest systems are open and connected to other populations from which species (or
opinions) can be rescued when endangered in any one patch. Similarly, we did not include
other aspects of real systems such as population or spatial heterogeneities. These simplifying
assumptions can and should be relaxed in future research so that mathematical models of
22
coupled human-environment system dynamics can provide more insights and better inform
environmental policy.
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Hale, J. K. and Koçak, H. (2012). Dynamics and bifurcations, volume 3. Springer Science
& Business Media.
Heinen, J. T. and Yonzon, P. B. (1994). A review of conservation issues and programs in
nepal: from a single species focus toward biodiversity protection. Mountain Research and
Development, pages 61–76.
Helbing, D., Yu, W., Opp, K.-D., and Rauhut, H. (2010). The emergence of homogeneous
norms in heterogeneous populations. American Journal of Sociology, submitted.
Henderson, K., Bauch, C. T., and Anand, M. (2016). Alternative stable states and the
sustainability of forests, grasslands and agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the USA, in press.
Henderson, K. A., Anand, M., and Bauch, C. T. (2013). Carrot or stick? modelling how
landowner behavioural responses can cause incentive-based forest governance to backfire.
PloS one, 8(10):e77735.
Innes, C., Anand, M., and Bauch, C. T. (2013). The impact of human-environment interac-
tions on the stability of forest-grassland mosaic ecosystems. Scientific reports, 3.
Lade, S. J., Tavoni, A., Levin, S. A., and Schlüter, M. (2013). Regime shifts in a social-
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